JWT Decoder

Decode and inspect JSON Web Tokens — view header, payload, signature, and expiry details.

JWT Token
Paste your token below (never share real tokens)

Paste a JWT token and click Decode to see its contents

Debugging JWT & OIDC Tokens in Kubernetes, CI/CD & Cloud IAM

JSON Web Tokens (JWT, RFC 7519) are compact, URL-safe tokens composed of three dot-separated Base64URL segments: header.payload.signature. Modern passwordless cloud authentication relies heavily on short-lived OIDC JWTs instead of static long-lived API keys.

Where DevOps Engineers Encounter JWTs

  • Kubernetes ServiceAccount Tokens: Pods mount bound projected tokens at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token with kubernetes.io namespace and pod claims.
  • CI/CD OIDC Federation: GitHub Actions and GitLab CI mint OIDC JWTs to assume AWS IAM roles or Azure Federated Credentials without storing cloud secrets.
  • API Gateways & Ingress Auth: Validating exp, nbf, and role/group claims from Entra ID, Auth0, Keycloak, or Okta.

Decode a JWT Payload in the Terminal

# Decode header and payload with jq
jq -R 'split(".") | .[0],.[1] | @base64d | fromjson' <<< "$JWT"

# Mint a short-lived Kubernetes ServiceAccount token
kubectl create token my-service-account --duration=10m
Frequently Asked Questions

Is it safe to decode a JWT in a browser tool?

This tool decodes tokens 100% locally in your browser using Web APIs—nothing is transmitted over the network. Even so, you should always treat production bearer tokens as live credentials and prefer decoding short-lived staging or expired tokens when debugging.

Does decoding a JWT verify its cryptographic signature?

Decoding only Base64URL-decodes the header and payload segments so you can inspect the claims and expiration time. Cryptographic signature verification requires the issuer's secret key (for HMAC algorithms like HS256) or public JWKS key (for RSA/ECDSA algorithms like RS256 and ES256).

What do the standard JWT claims iss, sub, aud, exp, and iat mean?

iss (Issuer) identifies the authority that issued the token; sub (Subject) identifies the user or service account; aud (Audience) specifies the intended recipient API or cloud provider; iat (Issued At) and exp (Expiration Time) are Unix epoch timestamps in seconds.

Why is my GitHub Actions OIDC or Kubernetes projected ServiceAccount token failing authentication?

In 90% of OIDC federation failures (AWS STS, Azure Workload Identity, GCP Workload Identity), either the aud (audience) claim or the sub (subject, such as repo:org/repo:ref:refs/heads/main) does not exactly match the trust policy configured on the IAM role. Decoding the token lets you compare the actual sub and aud claims character by character.

Related Engineering Guides

Learn more about identity, RBAC, and OIDC authentication: