Azure Identity and Access Management: Complete Guide
Master Azure IAM — RBAC roles, managed identities, service principals, and access control patterns for secure cloud operations.
Table of Contents
- Identity Types
- Azure RBAC
- Managed Identities
- Service Principals
- Role Assignments
- Privileged Identity Management
- Best Practices
- Common Patterns
- Troubleshooting
Identity Types
| Type | Purpose | Where |
|---|---|---|
| User | Human accounts | Microsoft Entra ID |
| Service Principal | App/service identity | Microsoft Entra ID |
| Managed Identity | Azure-managed SP | Azure resource-linked |
| Group | Collection of users | Microsoft Entra ID |
Azure RBAC
Role-Based Access Control controls what identities can do on Azure resources.
Built-in Roles
| Role | Scope | Permissions |
|---|---|---|
| Owner | Full access + manage access | Everything |
| Contributor | Full resource access | Can't grant access |
| Reader | View-only | Read only |
| User Access Administrator | Manage access | RBAC only |
Common Workload Roles
Azure Kubernetes Service Cluster Admin Role — manage AKS
Storage Blob Data Contributor — read/write blobs
Key Vault Secrets Officer — manage secrets
Virtual Machine Contributor — manage VMs
Network Contributor — manage networking
Scopes
/subscriptions/{sub-id} — subscription level
/subscriptions/{sub-id}/resourceGroups/{rg} — resource group level
/subscriptions/.../resourceGroups/{rg}/providers/... — resource level
Always assign at the lowest scope possible.
Managed Identities
The preferred way for Azure services to authenticate — no credentials to manage.
Types
| System-Assigned | User-Assigned | |
|---|---|---|
| Lifecycle | Tied to resource | Independent |
| Multi-resource | No | Yes |
| Use case | Simple, single service | Shared identity across services |
Enable System-Assigned
# Enable on a VM
az vm identity assign -g my-rg -n my-vm
# Enable on an AKS cluster
az aks update -g my-rg -n my-cluster --enable-managed-identity
Use in Code
// C# — Azure SDK picks up managed identity automatically
var credential = new DefaultAzureCredential();
var client = new SecretClient(new Uri("https://myvault.vault.azure.net/"), credential);
# Python
from azure.identity import DefaultAzureCredential
from azure.keyvault.secrets import SecretClient
credential = DefaultAzureCredential()
client = SecretClient(vault_url="https://myvault.vault.azure.net/", credential=credential)
Service Principals
When managed identities can't be used (CI/CD pipelines, Terraform, external tools).
Create
az ad sp create-for-rbac \
--name terraform-sp \
--role Contributor \
--scopes /subscriptions/{sub-id}/resourceGroups/my-rg
Terraform Authentication
export ARM_CLIENT_ID="..."
export ARM_CLIENT_SECRET="..."
export ARM_SUBSCRIPTION_ID="..."
export ARM_TENANT_ID="..."
Or use Azure CLI authentication (for local dev):
az login
Better: Workload Identity Federation
No secrets at all — uses OIDC tokens from GitHub Actions/Azure DevOps:
az ad app federated-credential create \
--id <app-object-id> \
--parameters '{
"name": "github-federated",
"issuer": "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com",
"subject": "repo:myorg/myrepo:ref:refs/heads/main",
"audiences": ["api://AzureADTokenExchange"]
}'
Role Assignments
Assign a Role
az role assignment create \
--assignee <principal-id> \
--role "Storage Blob Data Contributor" \
--scope /subscriptions/{sub-id}/resourceGroups/my-rg
List Assignments
# Who has access to a resource group
az role assignment list --resource-group my-rg --output table
# What roles does a user have
az role assignment list --assignee user@example.com --output table
Remove an Assignment
az role assignment delete \
--assignee <principal-id> \
--role "Contributor" \
--scope /subscriptions/{sub-id}/resourceGroups/my-rg
Best Practices
1. Prefer Managed Identities
# Don't do this — secrets to manage
az ad sp create-for-rbac --name my-app --role Contributor
# Do this instead — no secrets
az vm identity assign -g my-rg -n my-vm
az role assignment create \
--assignee $(az vm show -g my-rg -n my-vm --query identity.principalId -o tsv) \
--role Reader \
--scope /subscriptions/{sub-id}
2. Minimum Privilege
# Bad — Contributor on entire subscription
--role Contributor --scope /subscriptions/{sub-id}
# Good — specific role on specific RG
--role "Storage Blob Data Contributor" \
--scope /subscriptions/{sub-id}/resourceGroups/my-rg
3. Use Groups, Not Individuals
# Create a group for team access
az ad group create --display-name "AKS-Admins" --mail-nickname aksadmins
# Assign role to the group
az role assignment create \
--assignee $(az ad group show -g "AKS-Admins" --query id -o tsv) \
--role "Azure Kubernetes Service Cluster Admin" \
--scope /subscriptions/{sub-id}
4. Review Regularly
# Find all assignments on a subscription
az role assignment list --all --output table > access-review.csv
Common Patterns
AKS Accessing ACR
# Give AKS's kubelet identity pull access to ACR
az aks update -g my-rg -n my-cluster --attach-acr my-acr
Terraform Service Principal
SP=$(az ad sp create-for-rbac --name tf-sp --role Contributor --scopes /subscriptions/{sub-id})
export ARM_CLIENT_ID=$(echo $SP | jq -r .appId)
export ARM_CLIENT_SECRET=$(echo $SP | jq -r .password)
export ARM_TENANT_ID=$(echo $SP | jq -r .tenant)
export ARM_SUBSCRIPTION_ID="{sub-id}"
App Service Reading Key Vault
# Enable managed identity
az webapp identity assign -g my-rg -n my-app
# Grant Key Vault access
az keyvault set-policy \
--name my-vault \
--object-id $(az webapp show -g my-rg -n my-app --query identity.principalId -o tsv) \
--secret-permissions get list
GitHub Actions with OIDC
# .github/workflows/deploy.yml
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
steps:
- uses: azure/login@v2
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# No client_secret needed — OIDC handles auth
Privileged Identity Management
PIM (Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management) solves "who has admin access right now?" — the problem that static role assignments can't answer:
- Just-in-time elevation — users have eligible assignments, not active ones. They activate Contributor for 4 hours, do their work, and the access expires automatically. No standing admin credentials to steal.
- Approval workflows — activation can require a manager's approval, MFA, and a justification. The audit trail is built in.
- Access reviews — periodic attestation that each person still needs their role. "Does Alice still need Owner on prod?" gets answered quarterly, not never.
PIM is free for Microsoft Entra ID P2 tenants and the single highest-value security feature most teams don't enable. If your organization has more than a handful of people with Contributor access, JIT activation is worth the setup overhead.
Troubleshooting
"Insufficient privileges" errors
# Check what role the caller has
az role assignment list --assignee <id> --all --output table
Managed identity not working
# Verify the identity exists
az vm show -g my-rg -n my-vm --query identity
# Check the role assignment was created
az role assignment list --assignee $(az vm show -g my-rg -n my-vm --query identity.principalId -o tsv)
Service principal expired
az ad app credential reset --id <app-id>
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Our tutorials and troubleshooting runbooks are written by a DevOps practitioner with hands-on experience operating Kubernetes, Terraform, CI/CD pipelines, and Linux infrastructure in production. Commands, manifests, and configurations are verified against current tooling releases. Learn more about our editorial process or report a correction or outdated flag.